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POLAND: Government Res	solve		
The regime is intent in anti-Soviet activity.	on making clear its o	letermination to rei	ⁿ 25 X 1
Polish media reportings in the southwester banned following the diaganda" there. At least detained, and Solidarit were not released; Wrock ready begun a strike at the since the founding of Sanfaurad.	on province of Wromistribution of "are station of "are statement as the claw transit worked the ban-the fire solidarity last years.	oclaw had been ati-Soviet prop- ty activists were trike if they ers may have al- to be imposed earis to be	
enforced. It could ser law plans long in prepa vide a gauge of popular	aration, and it wi		25 X 1
The show of govern partly to prompt Solidatoday in Gdanskto make Soviet agitators. Solidativiticized such activitinterests, but he will is sure that the govern charge to mask a cracket	arity leaderswho we some effort to idarity leader Wal ty as harmful to to be reluctant to comment is not using	o are meeting control anti- esa has previous the union's comment until he the "anti-Sovie	
activities.			25X1
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FRANCE-USSR: Gas Pipeline Project	
The French Government's decision to reexamine a contract associated with the proposed Soviet natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe could further strain relations.	25 X 1
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A French refusal to approve the deal, however, would not be a major obstacle to completing the pipeline project, because several other West European and Japanese firms have actively bid on the contract. The USSR nevertheless will be displeased by the delay. The Soviets appreciated the more forthcoming attitude of the Giscard government,	25X1
the distance government,	25X1
The Soviets have grown increasingly disturbed about the policies of President Mitterrand's government. Late last week, for example, an authoritative two-part article by Pravda's editor in chief criticized France's conduct of relations with the USSR and other major elements of French foreign policy, particularly its stand on TNF. The article was timed to coincide with Mitterrand's visit to the US.	

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CYPRUS: Tougher Greek Position		
The election of Greek Socialist Andreas Patainly signals a hardening of the Greek and Greet on the Cyprus issue and diminishes the prospects	k Cypriot positions	
Cypriot President Kyprianou and Pap in Athens today to coordinate policy on advocates a unified and independent Cypr he supports complete demilitarization of demand aimed at removal of Turkish troop mantling of the British bases.	Cyprus. Papandrus. In addition the island, a and the dis-	eou
Papandreou also will support a more Cypriot bargaining stance. He favors li tions to the whole range of Greek-Turkis issues. Greek Cypriots hailed Papandreou's	nking the negoti h bilateral Aege victory, but the	an 25 X 1
Turkish Cypriot reaction was cautious an	d restrained.	25X1
Papandreou's approach will jeopardi munal talks and hinder UN efforts for a The UN plan calls for rotating the presi Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a special de for northern Cyprus, and a territorial s 70 percent to the Greeks and 30 percent	Cyprus settlemendency between the velopment fund ettlement giving to the Turks.	it. e
The plan is tentatively scheduled f when the intercommunal talks resume on 2 agreements within the UN Secretariat its and strategy and negative reactions by K auger well for its prospects. If the UN the Greek Cypriots are likely to place t once again before the UN General Assembl traditionally have gained strong internal	7 October. Diself over substantyprianou do not initiative fail he Cyprus problety, where they tional sympathy.	.s,

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OPEC: Possible Price Agreement

Venezuela may announce its support for the new Saudi benchmark price for crude oil at the Cancun summit, where President Herrera can present it as Venezuela's contribution to Third World development. Venezuelan Energy Minister Berti is publicly indicating his approval of a new benchmark price of \$34 per barrel for OPEC crude oil, although Caracas has not yet officially endorsed it. The loss of revenue resulting from a cut in the price of light crude, which accounts for less than 20 percent of Venezuela's oil exports, would easily be offset by raising the prices of medium and heavy crudes, which are underpriced in relation to the \$34 benchmark. At its meeting next week in Geneva, OPEC will seek agreement on the new benchmark; a price freeze through 1982 may be part of the package.

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NORTH YEMEN - USSR: President Salih's Visit

President Salih apparently will visit Moscow within the next few days to discuss debt rescheduling and probably increased military assistance. Salih repeatedly has threatened to make the trip,

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Although the Soviets want to strengthen their influence in Sanaa, they may not make any major new commitments to deliver weapons

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TURKEY: Constituent Assembly Convenes

The Constituent Assembly, which starts work tomorrow, is composed of political unknowns, a quarter of them named by the ruling National Security Council and the rest selected by it from lists provided by provincial leaders. Although many in Western Europe may recognize that the assembly is a first step toward the restoration of civilian rule, the exclusion of former politicians, the undemocratic selection process, and the abolition of political parties are likely to cause continued criticism in Western Europe. The generals probably will not be diverted from their course, although they may try to placate their critics by making concessions on some peripheral political issues.

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